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 Abstract 
The EU regulation of fisheries is decided in two levels. The level of 
the total allowable catch (TAC) for the most important species is de-
cided every year by the Council of Minsters. The TACs are allocated 
to the Member States as quotas. The Member States determine who is 
going to harvest the quota. There is, however, an information problem 
associated with this structure. It does not take into account how effi-
cient fishermen in different countries are. In this paper we model the 
information problem as an adverse selection problem and analyse an 
EU tax coupled to effort as an alternative to the TAC system. We 
work with the hypothesis that EU suffers from a fiscal illusion and in-
cludes tax revenue in the objective function in order to finance other, 
also inefficient, operations. Even in the light of these imperfections 
there are at least two reasons for recommending an EU tax. First, it 
can be used to correct part of the market failure associated with fish-
ery. Second, it can be used to secure correct revealation of types in the 
light of asymmetric information.  Table of contents 
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1 Introduction 
The EU regulation of fisheries is decided on two levels. For example, 
the level of the total allowable catch (TAC) for the most important 
species is decided every year by the Council of Ministers. The TACs 
are allocated as quotas to the Member States. The Member States then 
determine which fishermen are going to harvest the quota. The main 
purpose with the TACs is to protect the stocks. 
 
There are several problems with this scheme. It does not take into ac-
count how efficient fishermen in different countries are. The alloca-
tion scheme (called relative stability) was established in 1983 and has 
not been changed since. There are incentives in a quota management 
system to high grade and illegal landings
2. Further, the Member States 
do not have incentives to conduct an effectient control and enforce-
ment system. Generally speaking, the allocation scheme does not 
solve the general common property problem of the fisheries. 
 
A more efficient system using the TAC framework is to use informa-
tion from each Member State about the efficiency of the fishermen to 
decide on the allocation of TACs. However, this information might be 
biased, i.e. an asymmetric information problem is present. In the pre-
sent paper this information problem is handled by setting up an incen-
tive scheme based on taxes on effort. In other words we wish to study 
a tax system as an alternative to the TACs. 
 
We model the information structure in the EU as an adverse selection 
problem (imperfect information about an exogenous cost parameter). 
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One can question if this is the right information hypothesis to use with 
regard to the information problems associated with fishery regulation. 
However the analysis must be seen as a first attempt to analyze a dou-
ble principal-agent relation (section 4) within fishery regulation. The 
adverse selection hypothesis is selected in order to make models as 
simple as possible. For the same reason the focus in this paper is on 
the calculation and evaluation of marginal taxes. 
 
Some comments to the literature relevant for this paper. Within the 
traditional environmental economics there is some discussion of opti-
mal regulation in the light of asymmetric information, see e.g. Roberts 
and Spence (1976), Kwerel (1977) and Jebjerg and Lando (1997). 
Roberts and Spence (1976) and Jebjerg and Lando (1997) combine the 
use of transferable pollution permits and taxes/subsidies to arrive at a 
first-best optimum. An assumption here is, however, that there are no 
market failures in the market for pollution permits, which is a restric-
tive assumption, see Dasquata et al (1980). Others therefore prefer to 
use one economic instrument and analyze a second-best optimum in 
the light of asymmetric information. E.g. Jebjerg and Lando (1997) 
conduct a principal-agent analyze of taxes under moral hazard and ad-
verse selection. Our analyis is in line within the principal-agent analy-
sis in Jebjerg and Lando (1997), but differs in two respects. First, we 
are interested in taxing a renewable resource. Second, the models are 
not purely normative. Even though the EU is interested in correcting a 
market failure, it also suffers from a fiscal illusion and include tax 
revenue in t he objective function. We, however, find optimal regula-
tion for a natural resource a very promising research area.  
 
Within environmental economics there is also some discussion about 
central versus decentral regulation in the light of asymmetric informa-  9
tion, see Jeppesen (1997), List (1997), Klibanoff and Poitevin (1995), 
Rob (1989) and Farrell (1987). One main conclusion within this litera-
ture is that imperfect information at the federal level can be an argu-
ment for decentral regulation. Our analysis differs from these since we 
are interested in discussing taxing of a natural resource from the point 
of view of the federal level. 
 
Within fishery economics a game theoretical framework is normally 
used to analyze the relation between countries, see e.g. Naito and Po-
lansky (1997), Munro (1996) and Kaitala (1986). These authors nor-
mally compare a cooperative and a non-cooperative solution to the 
fishery game under full information and try to discuss instruments that 
might induce the cooperate solution. Here we u se a principal-agent 
approach and analyze the relation between a federal and local gov-
ernmental level under asymmetric information. 
 
In section 2 we will introduce the model that is used with an analysis 
of full information, while section 3 contains a simple adverse selection 
model where the Member States disregard the resource restriction. In 
section 4 we will analyze a more advanced adverse selection model. 
2 Introduction to the model – full informa-
tion 
We will set up a model with short run production functions inspired 
by Andersen (1979), where the stock for fishermen j in country i is 
exogenous given. On the EU level the total production is assumed to 
be equal to the growth of the stock, i.e. the model is in biological and 
economic equilibrium. The reason for selecting this model is that it is   10
well suited for analyzing problems of asymmetric information, since it 
does not include dynamic aspects.
3 
 
The first question we encounter is how to model the Member States. 
One could use a traditional open access assumption between Member 
States.
4 We will not do this, as the analysis is not purely normative. In 
reality, EU is engaged in various entry and exit adjustment programs 
such as the MAGP.
 5 We will therefore assume that we have an indus-
try in country i with k fishermen. But what shall we assume that the 
Member States maximize? Clearly, the resource rent must be incorpo-
rated, but unlike the case for most traditional fishery economics, the 
EU tax is not purely set for reasons of economic efficiency, and we 
will subtract tax costs from the resource rent. This choice appears to 
be consistent with the theory of regulation of firms under asymmetric 
information.
6 In this and the following section, we will assume that the 
Member States totally disregard the resource restriction. We therefore 
assume that Member States i maximize: 
 





x is the fish stock 
Eij is the level of effort for the fishermen j of country i 
                                                                 
3  Dynamic models may be found many places in the litterature, see e.g. Conrad and 
Clark (1987). 
4  See e.g. Clark (1982) and Anderson (1995) for a discussion of open access models. 
5  See Frost et al (1995) for an evaluation of the decomposion scheme in Denmark and 
the Netherlands, and Holden (1994) for an overview over the MAGP-program. 
6  See e.g. Laffont and Tirole (1993).   11
p is an exogenous price 
Gij(x,Eij) is a short-run production function relating catch for fisher-
men j in country i, Gij, to the stock and effort, see Andersen (1979). 
 
We will assume that  dGij/dEij  > 0,  d
2Gij/dEij
2 = 0,  dGij/dx > 0 and 
d
2Gij/dxdEij = q. In other words, we operate with the production func-
tion Gij = qEijx, where q is the catchability coefficient. This function is 
often used within biological fishery models. Remark that catch is lin-
ear in both effort and stock. 
 
Cij(Eij) is the cost function for effort for fishermen j in country i. It is 
assumed that Cij' = cij and Cij´´ = 0 for E < E and Cij´ -> ¥ for E = E. E 
can be interpreted as a capacity limit for effort – an assumption that is 
used within the literature on public enterprise economics.
7 In other 
words we assume constant marginal costs up to a capacity limit. 
 
Tij(Eij) is the EU tax function. Note that EU taxes fishery effort, and 
that we imagine a system where the EU taxes the Member States on 
the basis of individual fishermen. At the moment it may seem more 
reasonable to work at macro level, but when we come to the more ad-
vanced model in section 4, the reason for this will become clear. Fur-
ther, the difference will vanish in the case where fishermen are homo-
geneous. Note also that we imagine a non-linear tax system in Eij. 
 
The first order condition is: 
 
pdGij/dEij – cij – Tij´ (Eij)= 0   (2) 
 
                                                                 
7  See e.g. Rees (1984).   12
The condition indicates that the value of the marginal product for ef-
fort is set equal to the marginal costs, which include the marginal tax 
costs. A marginal tax on Tij´(Eij) in the optimal point will generate Eij 
units of effort and the resource rent will be (pdGij/dEij – cij)Eij. In the 
following we assume that the marginal tax is such that Eij < E, where 
the capacity limit is the level of effort chosen without regulation. The 
basic welfare economic problem is that effort is too large in the un-
regulated model (the Member States do not include the effects on the 
fish stock). 
 
How do we model the EU? If we use a traditional normative approach 
as in Jebjerg and Lando (1997), we should assume that the EU maxi-
mizes the sum of the Member States welfare corrected with a shadow 
multiplier in front of public funds. We will not do so since we are also 
interested in conducting a positive analysis of the tax. Clearly, maxi-
mization of the resource rent must be incorporated. We will also as-
sume that the EU suffers from some degree of fiscal illusion with re-
spect to fishermen’s tax costs. Following Segerson et al (1997), we 
define a fiscal illusion as a situation where the EU only incorperates a 
part of the costs incurred by the Member States. In other words the 
fiscal illusion hypothesis means that EU does not full take into ac-
count the tax costs of the Member States when maximizing the bene-
fit. m < 1 captures the degree of the fiscal illusion – if m is large, the 
fiscal illusion is small. m may also be interpreted as compliance and 
enforcement costs associated with letting the EU tax the Member 
States on the basis of individual fishermen. We will also include the 
tax revenue from the Member States as a  benefit for EU. From the 
normative perspective this might be explained with the double divi-
dend hypothesis, but a more reasonable explanation is that the EU 
wishes to finance other, also inefficient operations, with the tax reve-  13
nue. The incorporation of tax revenue is therefore in line with the hy-
pothesis of a budget maximization bureaucrat in Niskanen (1971). 
Thus, our analysis is a mix between a normative and positive a p-
proach. Note, however that the model may be given a normative inter-
pretion with a double dividend hypothesis and compliance and e n-
forcement cost. Consequently, it is assumed that the EU will maxi-
mize: 
 
Max ￿￿pGij(x, Eij) – Cij(Eij) + (1 – m)Tij(Eij)  (3) 
Eij, x, Tij 
 
dx/dt = F(x) -￿￿Gij(x, Eij) = 0  (4) 
 
pGij(x, Eij) – Cij(Ei) – Tij(Eij) > 0 for all j = 1,…..,k and i = 1,…..,n  (5) 
 
In (4), F(x) is the natural growth rate of the fishery stock and it is as-
sumed that it will follow a standard logistic form. F(x) is drawn in fig-
ure 1. 
 
The implication of (4) is that we search for a steady-state equilibrium, 
where the natural growth rate is equal to catch so that the stock is ei-
ther x 1 or x 2. Note that the maximization procedure implies that we 
choose x 2. The implication of this is that in optimum the stock would 
be set where F´(x) < 0. 
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5) is a participation restriction, which is standard in principal-agent 
analyses, see Varian (1992). We have formulated the participation re-
striction as a condition that every fisherman must earn a non-negative 
resource rent net of taxes. Alternatively, the restriction could have 
been formulated as a non-negative benefit for the Member States 
(￿(pGij(x, Eij) – Cij(Eij) – Tij(Eij) > 0). The formulation in (5) says that 
the EU does not want to give the Member States any incentive to drive 
their fishermen out of the market  – the Member States is secured a 
non-negative benefit for every fisherman. (5) is stronger than a non-
negative benefit to the Member States, since the sum of the restric-
tions for all k fishermen in country i is ￿(pGij(x, Eij) – Cij(Eij) – Tij(Eij) 
> 0. For reasons of simplicity we have set the reservation utility to 
zero. Alternatively, we could have interpreted the zero as a result of 
normalization. As taxes shall be as large as possible, according to the 
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Tij(Eij) = p Gij(x, Eij) – Cij(Eij)  (6) 
 
The implication of (6) is that the Member States’ resource rent is 
taxed away. From the point of view of the EU this represents a bene-
fit, but for the Member States it is a drawback. 
 
By substitution (6) into (3) we obtain the following maximization 
problem: 
 




F(x) – ￿￿Gij(x, Eij) = 0  (8) 
 
The lagrange function may be written as: 
 
L = ￿￿ pGij(x, Eij) – Cij(Eij) + (1 – m)(pGij(x, Eij) – Cij(Eij)) + l(F(x) – 
￿￿Gij(x, Eij))  (9) 
 
where l > 0 is a lagrange multiplier and l is a measure for the value of 
a marginal increase in the resource stock. 
 
Our main interest is in the first-order condition for Eij: 
 
dL/dEij = pdGij/dEij – cij + (1 – m)(pdGij/dEij – cij) – ldGij/dEij = 0  (10) 
 
The optimal solution for the EU is where the marginal benefits are 
equal to the marginal costs. The marginal benefits consist of the mar-
ginal resource rent (pdGij/dEij - c ij) and the value of the marginal tax   16
revenue ((1 - m)(pdGij/dEij - cij)). The marginal costs for the EU are the 
effect on the resource stock of increased effort evaluated with the 
shadow price (ldGij/dEij). If Eij < E, the EU wants the Member States 
to produce to a point where pdGij/dEij – cij > 0. Thus, the EU captures 
part of the production externality associated with the fishery stock. 
Further, it is seen that the EU wants an effort level where the marginal 
costs are larger than the value of the marginal tax revenue (ldG/dEij > 
(1 – m)(pdG/dEij – cij) since pdGij/dEij – cij > 0). 
 
The optimal marginal tax may be found by equalizing (10) with (2). 
This yields: 
 
Tij´(Eij)= – (1 – m)(pdG/dEij – cij) + ldG/dEij  (11) 
 
From the above we know that ldG/dEij > (1 – m)(pdG/dEij – cij). There-
fore the marginal tax is positive. An interpretation of this tax may be 
found by contrasting it with the tax that would generate a pareto opti-
mum (the case where tax revenue is not included in the objective func-
tion and there ise no participation restriction). This would be Tij´(Eij)= 
ldGij/dEij, which entirely captures the externality nature of the fishery 
stock. In this case we name the optimal effort E*. Since the EU in-
cludes tax revenue in the objective function and suffers from a fiscal 
illusion, the value of the marginal tax revenue must be subtracted and 
we would expect that Eij > E*. If Eij < E the tax does, however, secure 
a welfare gain compared to the unregulated optimum, and from a 
normative perspective there are some benefits associated with using it. 
 
In appendix 1 we characterize the optimal marginal tax function. Here 
we want to illustrate the tax function and the optimal solution. This   17
can be done by drawing the Member States first-order condition, see 
figure 2.  
 
















Since l is increasing in effort with a decreasing rate (appendix 1), the 
marginal tax function looks like T ij´. E ij is the optimal level of effort, 
where the value of the marginal product is equal to the marginal costs 
(the level of effort the fishermen would exert given the tax imposed on 
the Member States). The area abce will be equal to OEijef since the 
participation restriction must be satisfied. 
3 A simple adverse selection model 
Assume now that the EU knows that fishermen j in country i belongs 
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Cij2(E) > C ij1(E) for all E, where the subscripts 1 and 2 devote types. 
EU has incomplete information about the type of fishermen j, but sets 
a probability,  ph for h = 1, 2 to type h. Since the constant marginal 
costs for type 2 are higher than the constant marginal costs for type 1, 
single crossing property is fulfilled.  
 
The basic incentive problem is that the low cost agent may pretend to 
be a high cost agent, because he can benefit from this. We assume that 
the EU wishes to design the tax system in such a way that there is an 
economic incentive for the countries to reveal the correct type of fish-
ermen. Technically, two self-selection restrictions are included in the 
model. 
 
EU’s maximization problem for fishermen j in country i is: 
 
Max ￿￿p1 (pGij1(x, Eij1) – Cij1(Eij1 ) + (1 – m)Tij1(Eij1)) +  
Eij1, Eij2, x, Tij1, Tij2 




F(x) -￿￿Gij1(x, Eij1) – ￿￿Gij2(x, Eij2) = 0  (13) 
 
pGij1(x, Eij1) – Cij1(Eij1) – Tij1(Eij1) > 0  (14) 
 
pGij2(x, Eij2) – Cij2(Eij2) – Tij2(Eij2) > 0  (15) 
 
pGij1(x, Eij1) – Cij1(Eij1) – Tij1(Eij1) > pGij2(x, Eij2) – Cij1(Eij2) – Tij2(Eij2) 
  (16) 
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pGij2(x, Eij2) – Cij2(Eij2) – Tij2(Eij2) > pGij1(x, Eij1) – Cij2(Eij1) – Tij1(Eij1) 
  (17) 
 
where (16) and (17) are the self-selection restrictions. They express 
that the Member States must have an incentive to reveal the correct 
type of fishermen. A remark is in place with regard to (16). It is as-
sumed that if the Member States pretend that a low-cost fisherman is a 
high-cost fisherman, it must also induce a high-cost fisherman effort, 
induce a high-cost fisherman catch and pay a tax based on the assump-
tion that the fisherman is high cost type. In other words it is assumed 
that the EU uses all the information it can gather about the fishermen 
when taxing the Member States. 
 
In appendix 2 it is shown that Eij1 > Eij2. The low cost agents are there-
fore allowed to have an effort level that is at least as large as the high 
cost agents. Further it is shown that type 2’s participation restriction 
and type 1’s self-selection restriction are binding. This means that: 
 
pGij2(x, Eij2) – Cij2(Eij2) = Tij2(Eij2)  (18) 
 
pGij1(x, Eij1) – Cij1(Eij1) + Cij1(Eij2) – Cij2(Eij2) = Tij1(Eij1)  (19) 
 
Equation (18) indicates that the tax is designed in such a way that the 
high cost agent’s surplus is exhausted. Since Cij1(Eij2) – Cij2(Eij2) < 0 in 
(19), the low cost agent receives a surplus – an information rent. The 
notion of information rents to the most efficient types is a well-known 
result – see e.g. Varian (1992). 
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By substituting (18) and (19) into (12), we obtain a rewritten maximi-
zation problem and we can set up a lagrange function. The first-order 
condition for the effort levels is: 
 
dL/dEij1 = p1( pdGij1/dEij1 – cij1 + (1 – m)(pdGij1/dEij1 – cij1)) – ldGij1/dEij1 
= 0  (20) 
 
dL/dEij2 = p1 (1 – m)(cij1 – cij2) + p2(pdGij2/dEij2 – cij2 +  
 
(1 – m)(pdGij2/dEij2 – cij2)) – ldGij2/dEij2 = 0  (21) 
 
According to (20) the EU wishes to set the expected marginal benefit 
equal to expected marginal costs for type 1. The expected marginal 
benefits consist of the expected marginal resource rent and the mar-
ginal tax revenue. The marginal costs consist of the effect on the re-
source stock. Compared with full information, we see that we do not 
reach a full information optimum, if p1 < 1 (compare (10) with (21)). 
This effect is new compared to the standard principal-agent theory, 
see Varian (1992), and the reason for this is a restriction on the maxi-
mation problem. Note first that we cannot conclude that Eij1 > Eij be-
cause p1< 1. The reason for this l is different between the models and 
that  l is increasing in E (see appendix 1). Further, the optimal stock 
size (dGij1/dEij1 = qx) is different between from type to type. In Jensen 
and Vestergaard (1999) we compare Eij with Eij1. Here it is argued that 
we must expect Eji1 > Eij, since type 1 must be allowed an information 
rent. We note that the value of the marginal tax revenue ((1 – m)(pd
Gij1/dEij1 – cij1)) is less than the probability corrected marginal cost (1/
p1ldGij1/dEij1), as the marginal resource rent is positive. 
   21
For type 2 there is an extra cost. Because type 1 is present and must be 
given an incentive to reveal his type correctly, the first order condition 
of type 2 must be corrected with p1 (1 – m)(cij1 – cij2) < 0, which is re-
ferred to as the marginal incentive cost. We also note that the prob-
ability corrected marginal costs is larger than the value of the marginal 
tax revenue: 
 
(p1/p2(1 – m)(cij1 – cij2) + 1/p2ldGij2/dEij2  – (1 – m)(pdGij2/dEij2 – cij2) > 
0), because the marginal resource rent is positive. Comparing the op-
timal level of effort, E ij2, with the level of effort under full informa-
tion, E ij, we would expect that E ij2 < E ij. This is a standard result 
within analyses of adverse selection, see e.g. Varian (1992). 
 
The marginal tax may be found by equating (20) and (21) with (2): 
 
Tij1´(Eij1) = – (1 – m)(pdGij1/dEij1 – cij1) + 1/p1ldGij1/dEij1   (22) 
 
Tij2´(Eij2) = p1/p2(1 – m)(cij2 – cij1) + 1/p2ldGij2/dEij2  – (1 – m)(pdGij2/dEij2 
– cij2)   (23) 
 
It is shown above that the marginal tax revenue is less than the prob-
ability corrected marginal costs for type 1 ((1 – m)(pdGij1/dEij1 – cij1)) < 
1/p1ldGij1/dEij1). Therefore the marginal tax for type 1 is positive. In the 
same way it appears from (23) that Tij2´ is positive because the prob-
ability corrected marginal costs are larger than the value of the mar-
ginal tax revenue (p1/p2(1 – m)(cij1 – cij2) + 1/p2ldGij2/dEij2  + (1 – m)(pd
Gij2/dEij2 – cij2) > 0). Thus, the marginal tax is positive. Compared with 
full information the marginal tax for type 1 must be corrected with 1/p
1. For type 2 we must also correct with a measure of the cost differ-  22
ence between types. These corrections are made for information rea-
sons. 
 
The marginal tax function is analyzed in appendix 1. For reasonable 
values of the parameters, functions and allocation of types compared 
to the probabilities, the tax functions look like the graphs in figures 3 
and 4. 
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Again, the Member States first-order conditions are drawn. They in-
duce the fishermen to deliver Eij1 and Eij2 unit of effort. In figure 3 the 
information rent for type 1 is abcd – OfgEij1 and the effort level is Eij1. 
The information rent can also be seen from figure 4 as abcd. In figure 
4 the area abef is equal to OghEij2 since the participation restriction 
must be satisfied. 
4 A more advanced adverse selection model 
We might question some of the assumptions made in the simple 
model. That the Member States totally disregard the resource restric-
tion may not seem reasonable. Further, since the Member States are 
Tij2













a  b 
cij1 
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taxed, it must be expected that they will also tax the fishermen. One 
can  discuss whether the Member States include the restriction. In a 
non-cooperative Prisoners Dilemma game, it would be a Nash equilib-
rium for the Member States to disregard the resource restriction. In 
other words it would be rationally for the Member States not to take 
any resource conservation measures. Another argument for the propo-
sition that the Member States do not include the restriction is that EU 
already takes resource conservation measures. Because the EU i n-
cludes the restriction and the Member States know that the EU in-
cludes the restriction, the Member States would not take any resource 
conservation measures. However, Arnason (1990) builds a fishery 
economic model, where individual fishermen take some resource con-
siderations within a national regulatory framework. In other words the 
fishermen have in some sense altruistic preferences. This hypothesis is 
translated to Member States in this paper. In what follows we will 
therefore analyze a double principal-agent problem, see figure 5. 
 









We now allow that the Member States tax the fishermen and play part 
in respect to take resource conservation considerations (take into ac-
count part of the resource restriction). They wish to induce the fisher-
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ber States. They are, however, taxed from EU, and the EU uses their 
taxes to secure that the Member States regulate the fishermen to an 
optimal level of effort from the EU point of view. We solve the double 
principal-agent problem backwards – starting with the fishermen, then 
the Member States and finally EU. The basic question we ask is how 
the EU tax from section 3 must be modified? We assume that the 
Member States know the fishermen´s type with certainty but that EU 
has the information structure sketched in section 3. 
 
The first question we encounter is how to model the fishermen. We 
could use a traditional open-access assumption, but choose not to do 
so. The reason for this is that the Member States are engaged in vari-
ous entry and exit programs – e.g. the Netherlands have a system of 
individual transferable quotas and United Kingdom have a license sys-
tem
8. In line with the assumptions from section 2 fishermen j in coun-
try i are assumed to maximize the resource rent minus the tax paid to 
the Member States: 
 
Max pGij(x, Eij) – Cij(Eij) – Sij(Eij)  (24) 
Eij 
 
where Sij is the Member State tax. Again we imagine a non-linear, in-
dividual tax. 
 
The first order condition is: 
 
pdGij/dEij – cij – Sij´(Eij) = 0  (25) 
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and the value of the marginal product is set equal to marginal costs. If 
they were unregulated the fishermen would choose E. If they are regu-
lated with a marginal tax on Sij´ in optimum, they would choose Eij. 
 
What do we assume about Member State i? In line with previous as-
sumptions they are assumed to suffer from a fiscal illusion and include 
tax revenue from the fishermen in the objective function. Also, in line 
with the previous assumptions they include a participation restriction 
in the maximization problem. More important they are assumed to 
take some account for the resource restriction, but have state specific 
interests. More specifically, they want a biological and economic 
equilibrium  – but only with respect to catches by own fisherman. 
Thus, if k measures the degree of fiscal illusion, Member State i is as-
sumed to maximize: 
 
max ￿pGij(x, Eij) – Cij(Eij) – Tij(Eij) + (1 – k)Sij(Eij)  (26) 




F(x) – ￿Gij(x, Eij) = 0  (27) 
 
pGij(x, Eij) – Cij(Eij) – Sij(Eij) > 0  (28) 
 
Since taxes shall be as large as possible according to the benefit func-
tion, the participation restriction, (28), will always be binding. By sub-
stituting the binding participation restriction into the objective func-
tion we can set up a lagrange function. The first order condition for Eij 
is: 
dL/Eij = pdGij/dEij – cij+ (1 – k)(pdGij/dEij – cij)- T´(Eij) – mdGij/dEij = 0 
   27
  (29) 
 
where m > 0 is a lagrange multiplier and a measure for the marginal 
value of the fish stock evaluated from the point of view of the Mem-
ber States. We will assume that m < l, since the Member States only 
corrects the part of the production externality associated with their 
own fishermen. 
 
According to (29) the Member States set the marginal benefit equals 
to marginal costs. The marginal costs consist of the marginal fish 
stock costs of increased effort and the marginal EU tax costs. The 
marginal benefit is the marginal resource rent and the value of the 
marginal tax revenue. Note that the marginal costs must be larger than 
the value of the marginal tax revenue ((1 – k)(pdGij/dEij – cij) < T´(Eij) 
+ mdGij/dEij). 
 
We may find the marginal M ember State tax by equating (25) with 
(29): 
 
S´(Eij ) = – ( 1 – k)(pdGij/dEij – cij) + mdGij/dEij + Tij´(Eij)  (30) 
 
Above it is shown that the marginal costs are larger than the value of 
the marginal tax revenue. Therefore S ij´(Eij) > 0. The marginal Mem-
ber State tax consists of three components – the value of the marginal 
Member State tax revenue, the marginal EU tax and the marginal fish 
stock costs evaluated from the point of view of the Member States. In 
section 2 we arrived at a marginal EU tax consisting of two compo-
nents – the marginal tax revenue and the marginal resource costs both 
evaluated from the point of view of the EU. We must expect that k „ m 
and m  „ l, and there will be a difference between the marginal Mem-  28
ber State tax and the marginal EU tax from section 2. From the point 
of view of the EU there is still a rational for taxing. Since we assume 
that m < l the Member States only solve a part of the production ex-
ternality problem  – the part associated with their own fishermen. Note 
also that the Member States canalize the whole marginal EU tax to the 
fishermen. 
 
In appendix 1 the marginal tax function is characterized. It is drawn in 
figure 6, which sketch the fishermen´s first order condition. 
 
















In figure 6 the optimum effort exerted by the fishermen is E ij 
(pdGij/dEij = c ij + S ij´) and S ij is shaped as sketched. The area 0abEij 
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Now to the EU maximization problem. We retain all the assumptions 
from section 2 and 3 so: 
 
Max ￿￿p1(pGij1(x, Eij1) – Cij1(Eij1) + (1 – m)Tij1(Eij1)) + 




F(x) – ￿￿Gij1(x, Eij1) – ￿￿Gij2(x, Eij2) = 0  (32) 
 
pGij1(x, Eij1) – Cij1(Eij1) + (1- k)( pGij1(x, Eij1) – Cij1(Eij1)) – Tij1(Eij1) > 0 
  (33) 
 
pGij2(x, E ij2) – C ij2(Eij2) + (1 – k)(pGij2(x, Eij2) – Cij2(Eij2)) – Tij2(Eij2) > 
0  (34) 
 
pGij1(x, Eij1) – Cij1(Eij1) + (1 – k)( pGij1(x, Eij1) – Cij1(Eij1))- Tij1(Eij1) > 
 
pGij2(x, Eij2) – Cij1(Eij2) + (1 – k)( pGij2(x, Eij2) – Cij2(Eij2)) – Tij2(Eij2) 
  (35) 
 
pGij2(x, Eij2) – Cij2(Eij2) + (1 – k)( pGij2(x, Eij2) – Cij2(Eij2)) – Tij2(Eij2) > 
 
pGij1(x, Eij1) – Cij2(Eij1) + (1 – k) p(Gij2(x, Eij2) – Cij2(Eij2))- Tij1(Eij1) 
  (36) 
 
As regards participation restrictions, they are, as in section 2, formu-
lated with respect to individual fishermen. In other words the EU 
wants to secure the survival of each individual fisherman, and must   30
therefore give the Member States a positive benefit for each. With re-
gard to (35) and (36) it is, as in section 3, assumed that EU can moni-
tor the Member State tax, the catch and the effort for the fishermen. If 
Member States pretend a type 2, it must e.g. tax the fishermen on basis 
of a type 2 cost function.  
 
In appendix 2 it is shown that Eij1 > Eij2. Further, it is shown that type 
2’s participation restriction and type 1’s self-selection restriction is 
binding. For type 2 the Member States’ benefit, which consists of the 
resource rent and the value of the tax revenue, is exhausted, while the 
Member States receive an information rent on C ij2(Eij2) - C ij1(Eij2) for 
type 1. The results obtained here ((34) and (35)) are the same as in 
section 3. Substituting the binding restrictions into the objective func-
tion yields a new maximization problem. A lagrange function can be 
set up and differentiating it with respect to E ij1 and E ij2 results in the 
following first-order conditions: 
 
dL/dEij1 = p1(pdGij1/dEij1 – cij1 + (1 – m)(pdGij1/dEij1 – cij1) +  
 
(1 – m)(1 – k)(pdGij1/dEij1 – cij1)) – ldGij1/dEij1 = 0  (37) 
 
dL/dEij2 =  p1(1 – m)(cij1 – cij2) + p2(pdGij2/dEij2 – cij2 + (1 – m)(pdGij2/dEij2 
– cij2) + 
 
(1 – m)(1 – k)(pdGij2/dEij2 – cij2)) – ldGij2/dEij2 = 0  (38) 
 
Compared with the analysis in section 3, there is one additional mar-
ginal benefit associated with E – the benefit of the marginal tax reve-
nue to the Member State evaluated from the point of view of the EU. 
The reason for including this is that EU wishes to tax the value of the   31
Member State tax revenue away a ccording to the binding self-
selection and participation restrictions 
 
The marginal tax may be calculated by equating (37) and (38) with 
(29): 
 
Tij1´(Eij1) = – (1 – m)(pdGij1/dEij1 – cij1) – (1 – m)(1 – k)(pdGij1/dEij1 – cij1) 
+ 
 
(1 – k)(pdGij1/dEij1 – cij1) + 1/p1(l – m)dGij1/dEij1  (39) 
 
Tij2´(Eij2) = p1/p2(cij2 – cij1) – (1 – m)(pdGij2/dEij2 – cij2) – (1 – m)(1 – k)(p
dGij2/dEij2 – cij2)  
 
+ (1 – k)(pdGij2/dEij2 – cij2)) + 1/p2(l – m)dGij2/dEij2  (40) 
 
Note, that T ij1´ and Tij2´ may be a marginal subsidy rather than a mar-
ginal tax, if the level of effort the Member States wish is too low 
compared with the level EU prefers. We will, however, assume that 
this is not the case – e.g. m is small, which means that the production 
externality that the Member States correct is not too high. There are 
two differences with the tax in (39) and (40) compared to the tax in 
section 3. First, the marginal value of the Member State tax – evalu-
ated both from the point of view of the Member States and EU  – is 
included. Second, EU only corrects the part of the production exter-
nality that the Member States do not correct. One basis of the mar-
ginal taxes we may also compare the effort levels in this model with 
the effort levels in the simple adverse selection models. If the optimal 
stock is identical (dGij1/dEij1 = qx is the same) and l is the same for 
the two models the marginal tax for type 1 in this model is larger than   32
the marginal tax in the simple adverse selection model in the case m(1 
– k)(pdGij1/dEij1 – cij1) > 1/p1mdGij1/dEij1. 
 
If the marginal tax is larger the effort level will be lower.  m(1  – 
k)(pdGij1/dEij1 – cij1) is the marginal costs of letting the Member States 
tax, and  p1mdGij1/dEij1 is the marginal benefit of letting the Member 
States tax. Therefore the effort level in this model will be lower than 
the effort level in the simple adverse selection model if the marginal 
benefit of letting the Member States tax is lower  than the marginal 
costs. The same result holds for type 2. 
 
In appendix 1, the properties of the marginal tax functions are ana-
lyzed. The Member States first-order condition, (29), for type 1 may 
be written as: 
 
(2 – k)pdGij1/dEij1    =   (2 – k)cij1 + Tij1´(Eij1) + mdGij1/dEij1   (41) 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the first-order condition for the Member State if 
the fishermen are of type 1. 
   33
Figure 7: The optimal level of effort for type 1 in the advanced adver-
















Eij1 is the optimum level of effort, since (2 – k)pdGij1/dEij1 = (2 – k)cij1 
+ T ij1´+ m dGij1/dEij1. The information rent is the difference between 
the area abcd and the area 0Eij1e. 
 
The optimum for type 2 is drawn in figure 8. The Member States first-
order condition for type 2 may be written as: 
 
(2 – k)pdGij2/dEij2    =   (2 – k)cij2 + Tij2´(Eij2) + mdGij2/dEij2   (42) 
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Figure 8: The optimal level of effort for type 2 in the advanced adver-
















Eij2 is the level of effort. Since type 2’s participation restriction is ful-
filled 0Eij2ef = abcd. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper we have analysed an EU tax for fishery, under the as-
sumptions that the EU suffers from a fiscal illusion and includes tax 
revenue in the objective function. With these assumptions the tax does 
not secure an optimum, but it seems that letting EU tax the Member 
States has at least two desirable properties: The tax can be used to cor-
rect at least a part of the production externality associated with a fish-
ery stock and secondly: in the light of adverse selection, the tax can be 













(2-k)pdGij2/dEij2  a 
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We have conducted a single principal-agent analysis and concluded 
that the EU tax will consist of three components – a marginal value of 
the fish stock, an information correction component and a value of the 
marginal tax revenue component. In a double principal-agent analysis 
we must also incorporate the components reflecting the value of the 
marginal Member State tax. But is taxing better than the existing sys-
tem of TACs? Even in the light of the imperfections analysed here we 
believe so but there is a need for comparative evaluations of alterna-
tive regulatory regimes. The arguments for believing that a tax system 
is better than the TACs is as follows. The TACs are normally based on 
some MSY concept, and the allocation scheme of TACs to the Mem-
ber States has been determined in 1983 and has not been changed 
since. Further the quotas do not take account for differences in effi-
ciency between fishermen and do not lead to economic efficiency, see 
Clark (1990). Last TACs and quotas do not incorporate difference in 
information between EU, Member States and fishermen. In principal 
an EU tax solves all these problems. 
 
Our analysis is an example of what Russell (1994) calls complex regu-
lation. We have dropped some of the restrictive assumptions normally 
used in the discussions of regulatory regimes. Here we have skipped 
the traditional assumptions of perfect information. Further we have 
assumed a fiscal illusion and included tax revenue in the objective 
function. When one drops some simplifying assumptions one most 
accept other simplifying assumptions. In the models presented here 
there is no discussion of adjustment to equilibrium (we search a 
steady-state equilibrium) and there is no discounting rate (economic 
yield is maximized). Further it is assumed that the EU taxes fishery 
effort not output (effort is a multidimensional component). All these 
assumptions have been subject to a lot of criticism in the fishery eco-  36
nomic literature, see e.g. Clark (1990). In the present context they are 
justified with the inclusion of asymmetric information in the analysis 
of fishery economic regulation. Indeed the analysis can be seen as a 
first attempt to include asymmetric information in the discussion of 
regulation of fisheries. 
 
One can question the realism in letting EU tax the Member States on 
basis of individual fishermen. Remark, however, that  a federal tax is 
sometimes discussed in the economic literature, see e.g. Segerson et al 
(1997). Further an EU tax may be reasonable within the fishery since 
it corrects part of the production externality problem and can be used 
to cover part of the budget deficit in the EU. Last, contrary to a normal 
resource tax the tax analyzed here does not induce any exit of fisher-
men because of the participation restriction.   37
Appendix 1: The tax function 
In this appendix we characterize the properties of the tax function for 
all three models described in the text. 
 
The simple model – full information 
 
The first-order condition for x: 
 
dL/dx = ￿￿(pdGij/dx + (1 – m)pdGij/dx) + l(dF/dx – ￿￿dGij/dx) = 0  (1) 
 
We note that: 
 
l = -￿￿(pdGij/dx + (1 – m)pdGij/dx)/(F´(x) – ￿￿dGij/dx))  (2) 
 
By differentiating the tax function with respect to E ij we obtain (re-
member the properties assumed for the production function): 
 
Tij´´ = dl/dEij dGij/dEij  (3) 
 
The slope of the marginal tax function depends on how the shadow 
price develops with Eij. By differentiating l with respect to Eij we ob-
tain: 
 
dl/dEij = – F´(x)(pq + (1 – m)q)/(F´(x) – ￿￿dGij/dx )
2  (4) 
 
Since F´(x) < 0,dl/dEij > 0 and Tij´´ > 0. That the shadow price is in-
creasing in Eij seems to be a logical result, since the resource becomes 
more scarce as effort increases.   38
We will also be interested in the curvature of Tij´. Differentiating (3) 




2 dGij/dEij  (5) 
 
and differentiating (4) with respect to Eij yields: 
 
d
2l/dEij = – 2qF´(x)(pq + (1 – m)q)/(F´(x) – ￿￿dGij/dx)
3 < 0  (6) 
 
The implication is that the tax function looks like figure 3. 
 
The simple model – adverse selection 
 
The first-order condition for x is: 
 
dL/dx = ￿￿p1(pdGij1/dx + (1 - m) pdGij1/dx) + ￿￿p2(pdGij2/dx + 
 
(1 - m)pdGij2/dx + l(F´(x) - ￿￿dGij1/dx - ￿￿dGij1/dx) = 0   (7) 
 
This may be solved for l: 
 
l =  -(￿￿p1(pdGij1/dx + (1 - m) pdGij1/dx) + ￿￿p2(pdGij2/dx + 
 
(1 - m)pdGij2/dx)/ l(F´(x) - ￿￿dGij1/dx - ￿￿dGij1/dx)  (8) 
 
By differentiating Tij1´ with respect to Eij1 and Tij2´ with respect to Eij2 
we obtain: 
 
Tij1´´ = 1/p1 dGij1/dEij1 dl/dEij1  (9)   39
Tij2´´ = 1/p2 dGij2/dEij2 dl/dEij2  (10) 
 
and by differentiating l we obtain: 
 
dl/dEij1 =￿￿(p1 – p2)(pq + (1 – m)q) dGij2/dx - 
 
F´(x)p1(pq + (1 – m)q)/(F´(x) – ￿￿dGij1/dx – ￿￿dGij2/dx)
2  (11) 
 
dl/dEij2 =￿￿(p2 – p1)(pq + (1 – m)q )dGij1/dx - 
 
F´(x)p2(pq + (1 – m)q)/(F´(x) – ￿￿dGij1/dx – ￿￿dGij2/dx))
2  (12) 
 
For reasonable p1, p2, dGij1/dx, dGij2/dx and F´(x) we would expect the 
shadow price to increase with E for both types and therefore that the 
marginal tax function is increasing with E. If, however,  p1 is large, 
￿￿dGij2/dx is large and F´(x) is small it is possible Tij1´ will be nega-
tively sloped. The reason for this adverse effect is that there are a lot 
more type 2´s than expected. 
 
By differentiating (9) and (10) once more we obtain:  
 
Tij1´´´ = 1/p1 dGij1/dEij1 d
2l/dEij1
2  (13) 
 
Tij2´´´ = 1/p2 dGij2/dEij2 d
2l/dEij2
2  (14) 
 




2 =- (￿￿(p1 – p2)(pq + (1 – m)q) dGij2/dx  
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F´(x)p1(pq + (1 – m)q)q/(F´(x) - ￿￿dGij1/dx - ￿￿dGij2/dx)




2 =- (￿￿(p2 – p1)(pq + (1 – m)q )dGij1/dx  
 
F´(x)p2(pq + (1 – m)q)q/(F´(x) - ￿￿dGij1/dx - ￿￿dGij2/dx)
3  (16) 
 





0 and Tij1´´´, Tij2´´´ < 0. The implication of this is that the tax function 
looks like the graph in figure 3 and 4. 
 
c. The advanced model 
 
Here we will distinguish between: 
 
The Member State tax 
 
2. The EU tax 
 
c.1. The Member State tax 
 
The first-order condition with respect to x is: 
 
dL/dx = ￿(pdGij/dx + (1 – k)pdGij/dx) + m(F´(x) – ￿dGij/dx) = 0  (17) 
 
Solving for m gives: 
 
m = – (￿pdGij/dx + (1 – k)pdGij/dx)/ (F´(x) – ￿dGij/dx)  (18) 
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From (30) in section 4 we obtain: 
 
S´´(Eij) = dm/dEij dGij/dEij + T´´(Eij)  (19) 
 
Assume for a moment that T´´(Eij) > 0. Differentiating (18) with re-
spect to Eij we obtain: 
 
dm/dEij = – F´(x)(pq + (1 – k)q)/(F´(x) – ￿Gij(x, Eij))
2 > 0  (20) 
 




2 dGij/dEij + Tij´´´(Eij)  (21) 
 




2 = – (F´(x)(pq + (1 – k)q)q)/(F´(x) – ￿Gij(x, Eij))
3 < 0  (22) 
 
Therefore S´´´(Eij) < 0. 
 
c. 2. The EU tax 
 
The first-order condition for x is: 
  
dL/dx = ￿￿p1(pdGij1/dx + (1 – m)pdGij1/dx + (1 – m)(1 – k)(pdGij1/dx)) +  
 
￿￿p2(pdGij2/dx + (1 – m)pdGij2/dx + (1 – m)(1 – k)pdGij2/dx )+ 
 
l(F´(x) – ￿￿dGijl/dx – ￿￿dGij2/dx) = 0  (23) 
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By solving (23) for l we obtain: 
 
l = – (￿￿p1(pdGij1/dx + (1 – m)pdGij1/dx + (1 – m)(1 – k)(pdGij1/dx)) + 
 
￿￿p2(pdGij2/dx + (1 – m)pdGij2/dx + (1 – m)(1 – k)pdGij2/dx )/ 
 
(F´(x) – ￿￿dGijl/dx – ￿￿dGij2/dx)  (24) 
 
and again l is a measure for the value of the resource stock.  
 
By differentiating the tax functions we obtain: 
 
Tij1´´ =1/p1(dl/dEij1 – dm/dEij1)dGij1/dEij1  (25) 
 












2)dGij1/dEij1  (28) 
 
We will assume that T ij1´´, T ij2´´ > 0. This assumption seems reason-
able, since we assume that l > m. For the same reasons we would ex-
pect Tij1´´´, Tij2´´´ < 0.   43
Appendix 2: The restrictions 
In this appendix we will characterize the results from an analysis of 
the incentive comparability and participation restrictions in the simple 
and more advanced adverse selection model. 
 
The simple model 
 
The two self-selection restrictions may be written as: 
 
Tij2(Eij2) > pGij2(x, Eij2) – pGij1(x, Eij1) + Tij1(Eij1) +  
 
Cij1(Eij1) – Cij1(Eij2)  (1) 
 
Tij2(Eij2) < pGij2(x, Eij2) – pGij1(x, Eij1) + Tij1(Eij1) +  
 
Cij2(Eij1) – Cij2(Eij2)  (2) 
 
and (2) can only be fulfilled if:  
 
Cij1(Eij1) – Cij1(Eij2)< Cij2(Eij1) – Cij2(Eij2)  (3) 
 
and because of single crossing property this can only be fulfilled if Eij1 
> Eij2. 
 
For type 1 we have two restrictions, which may be written as: 
 
Tij1(Eij1) < pGij1(x, Eij1) – Cij1(Eij1)  (4) 
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Tij1(Eij1) < pGij1(x, Eij1) – Cij1(Eij1) – (pGij2(x, Eij2) - 
 
Cij1(Eij2) – Tij2(Eij2))  (5) 
 
Since the tax must be as large as possible, according to the objective 
function, one of these restrictions is binding. 
 
According to type 2’s participation restriction: 
 
pGij2(x, Eij2) – Cij2(Eij2) – Tij2(Eij2) > 0  (6) 
 
Single crossing property implies that: 
 
- Cij1(Eij2) > – Cij2(Eij2)  (7) 
 
and (7) implies that: 
 
pGij2(x, Eij2) – Cij2(Eij2) – Tij2(Eij2) > pGij2(x, Eij2) - 
 
Cij1(Eij2) – Tij2(Eij2) > 0  (8) 
0 
Since the expression in brackets in (5) is positive, it must be the self-
selection restriction that is binding. 
 
Since Tij2 shall be as large as possible, one of type 2’s restrictions must 
be binding. Can it be the self-selection restriction? If this is binding 
and we substitute the binding self-selection restriction for type 1 into 
the self-selection restriction for type 2, we obtain: 
 
Cij1(Eij1) – Cij1(Eij2) = Cij2(Eij2) – Cij2(Eij1)  (9)   45
(9) violates single crossing property. It must therefore be type 2’s par-
ticipation restriction that is binding. 
 
The advanced model 
 
First we show that E ij1 > E ij2. The two self-selection restrictions may 
be written as: 
 
Tij2(Eij2) > pGij2(x, Eij2) + (1 – k)(pGij2(x, Eij2) – Cij2(Eij2)) +  
 
Tij1(Eij1) – pGij1(x, Eij1) – (1 – k)(pGij1(x, Eij1) – Cij1(Eij1)) + 
 
Cij1(Eij1) – Cij1(Eij2)  (10) 
 
Tij2(Eij2) < pGij2(x, Eij2) + (1 – k)(pGij2(x, Eij2) – Cij2(Eij2)) +  
 
Tij1(Eij1) – pGij1(x, Eij1) – (1 – k)(pGij1(x, Eij1) – Cij1(Eij1)) + 
 
Cij2(Eij1) – Cij2(Eij2)  (11) 
 
and (11) can only be fulfilled if: 
 
Cij1(Eij1) – Cij1(Eij2) < Cij2(Eij1) – Cij2(Eij2)  (12) 
 
and because of single crossing property (12) implies that Eij1 > Eij2. 
 
Next, we show that type 1’s self-selection restriction is binding. Type 
1’s two self-selection restrictions may be written as: 
 
Tij1 < pGij1(x, Eij1) – Cij1(Eij1) + (1 – k)(pGij1(x, Eij1) – Cij1(Eij1))  (13)   46
Tij1 < pGij1(x, Eij1) – Cij1(Eij1) + (1 – k)(pGij1(x, Eij1) –  
 
Cij1(Eij1)) – (pGij2(x, Eij2) – Cij1(Eij2) + (1 – k)(pGij2(x, Eij2) –  
 
Cij2(Eij2)) – Tij2(Eij2)  (14) 
 
Again one of these restrictions must be binding, since taxes shall be as 
large as possible. Since single crossing property is fulfilled, and type 
2’s participation restriction in work, the term in brackets of (14) is 
positive. It must therefore be type 1’s self-selection restriction that is 
binding. 
 
Finally, we show that type 2’s participation restriction is binding. Be-
cause Tij2(Eij2) shall be as large as possible at least one of the restric-
tions is binding. By substituting the binding type 1 self-selection re-
striction into type 2’s self-selection restriction we obtain (9), which 
violates single crossing property. It must therefore be type 2’s partici-
pation restriction that is binding.   47
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